Chapter 28
Mihail Kogalniceanu Military Air Base, Romania
April 11, 2006
An unmarked Ford sedan drove Charles across the extensive airbase, toward a cluster of concrete buildings that had seen better days. The vehicle passed through a guarded gate in a new chain link fence.
His driver escorted him into one of the buildings where two officers were waiting. A corporal attended to some telecommunications equipment.
The older of the two introduced himself. “I'm General Waxley. This is Captain Freedman. I hope this meeting hasn't inconvenienced you, but we felt an in-person briefing was appropriate.”
Charles wasn't aware he'd had a choice in the matter.
The General continued without waiting for a response. “Colonel Saltvitz, commanding officer of
the 75th Ranger Regiment will join us by videoconference.
“Mr. Corrigan, I represent SOCOM – The Special Operations Command. We are responsible for all US Special Forces. I have brought you here today for several reasons.
“The primary reason is to brief Colonel Saltvitz on the events that have occurred since the MAADS systems were deployed. He also needs to understand the system's capabilities because we intend to rely on those capabilities in an upcoming mission. While the Colonel and the Captain here have read the specifications, it's appropriate for you to provide background to help them get a clearer understanding of the system capabilities and limitations, before we put men's lives at risk.
“A particular concern of mine, is control and oversight of autonomous weapons. We find ourselves in a situation that arguably we should have better anticipated. Missions are proceeding outside the established chain of command, and all that entails, and I have been charged with looking at how we bring these technologies into our C2 systems and existing military structures.
“Captain Freedman has two roles. He will be your liaison officer, the point of contact between the MAADS team and both the Army Rangers and SOCOM. In that capacity, he will ensure MAADS contributes to the overall success of the mission.
“His other role is to advise me on MAADS performance. A specific responsibility of mine, is evaluating new technologies and weapon systems, some of which, frankly, are of marginal value.”
Without warning or asking if Charles needed clarification, the General switched to a conversational tone.
“How are you enjoying life on the base?”
Charles replied, “The accommodation is spartan, but the food is much better than I expected.”
“Good food is one way we make these hardship postings more bearable.”
“And your people?”
“A couple of them want to know why we are under guard all the time.”
“This is a large base. Jointly built by the Russians and the Romanian government. Neither is interested in using it at present. We are interested because of its strategic location. Having said that, this is not our base and much of it still needs to be cleaned up. It would be dangerous for a civilian to wander around.”
The General appeared to have finished with the small talk, and stood waiting. Charles inspected the room. It was a crumbling concrete box, with peeling paint, and a rundown quality. A small table and half a dozen collapsible chairs occupied the center.
In sharp contrast to the rest of the room, along one wall were a large new whiteboard on wheels, the telecommunications equipment the Corporal was working on, and two large-scale maps, one of the Black Sea and the other of the Caucasus region.
A screen beside the Corporal came to life and showed a tall officer in his late thirties standing in what might have been his office. The Corporal said, “We are online now, sir.”
The man on the screen said, “Can you hear me, General?”
General Waxley replied, “Yes, we can Colonel. I'll assume you can hear me.”
“Loud and clear.”
“I have Mr. Corrigan and Captain Freedman with me. Before we start the briefing, do you have any questions, Mr. Corrigan?”
“I have one question. I'd like to know why am I only briefing the three of you?”
The General replied, “The Army does not deliberately keep officers and men in the dark. However, MAADS is classified equipment, and unless you can present a reason why more people need to know the nature of the equipment, they will only be told that we have a surveillance asset capable of providing near real time intelligence.”
Charles couldn't think of a reason. In his experience, users needed to know what technology did, and how it would help them do their job. Telling them how it worked, generally proved a distraction.
The General indicated Charles should start his briefing and he started speaking.
“We were notified four weeks ago, on March thirteenth, that we had two weeks to prepare as many MAADS systems as possible, and a support team, to deploy at forty-eight hours notice. We received the Deployment Order nine days ago.
“Before we left, we were given maps and satellite photographs of the proposed deployment locations, and I was asked to confirm whether they were suitable for MAADS.”
The General asked, “And were they?”
“The ground was snow-covered in all the photographs, and I had to say we weren't sure. They looked suitable from the topographic maps, but topographic maps aren't detailed enough for our purposes. We were also given images produced by ground mapping radar, and they showed the locations were flat enough for MAADS to deploy and contained a suitable sheltered depression in the ground.
“All four locations were mountain passes. I believe geographers call these features 'cols'. They are areas of flat ground between mountain peaks where the heads of two river valleys, running down either side of the mountain range, meet. Three of the cols were devoid of tree cover. The fourth was mostly tree-covered, but did have areas of bare rock. I agreed, all four seemed suitable deployment sites, although I expressed reservations about the fourth.
"Three days later, we were on a military transport aircraft en route to here. Although we weren't told that Romania was our destination until we were in the air.”
The General asked, “How was the flight?”
“Let's say, I'll never complain about traveling economy class again.”
“Continue, Mr. Corrigan.”
“We landed here at this airfield, and US personnel unloaded the four MAADS systems we had prepared for deployment. We went through our predeployment checks before the systems were taken away, and I understand, loaded onto another aircraft we didn't see. We were then taken to the portable offices we now occupy, and told to get our monitoring system up and running immediately, as the aircraft was sitting on the tarmac waiting to go.
“Less than six hours later everything checked out, and I gave the go ahead. I then told my people to get a few hours sleep, as there was nothing further they could do until the MAADS systems were paradropped onto their deployment locations.”
The General said, “All three of us know what happened in that deployment, but could you give us your perspective, Mr. Corrigan?”
“Three of the systems deployed successfully. The fourth failed. We don't how or why. It didn't transmit, and it didn't respond to our transmissions. We were told the only visual image we could get was via a satellite, and it would not be real-time.”
“What did that image show you?”
“The MAADS system was at the base of a steep mountainside several hundred meters from its planned landing site. It looked like it had tumbled down the slope, judging from the damage we could see on the satellite images.
“When we requested through our military liaison officer for it to be recovered, we were told it couldn't be recovered, and we would have to destroy it. As a result, we scheduled time on a satellite capable of providing visual images of the area. When the satellite was overhead, we sent out the destruction command, which caused the MAADS system to fire its built-in demolition charges.”
“Did the demolition charges destroy the system?”
“As far as we could determine, they did. The satellite photographs showed the MAADS system burning fiercely, as it is designed to.”
The General asked, “Can you elaborate on that statement?”
“One of our design criteria was to ensure we could remotely destroy the whole MAADS system or any autonomous part of MAADS, so all the units are rigged with thermal charges. The thermal charges burn hot enough to destroy the electronics and data storage in the control unit and the autonomous vehicles, as well as seriously damage most nonmetallic materials. The thermal charges are fired by a remote command. Once that happens, there is not much left, just some badly burned scrap. A contractor installed the thermal charges for us, and I just have a basic understanding of how they work.”
“Is there anything left that can identify the equipment's origin?”
“You might be able to read the VINs or chassis numbers on the all-terrain-vehicles used in the tactical mobile robots, but not much else.”
The General said, “Thank you, Mr. Corrigan. We are just confirming we don't need to send in a demolition team or bomb the site.”
Charles responded, “I assure you, if the charges went off, and they did, there is nothing useful to recover, maybe twenty dollar's worth of scrap metal.”
“Can we deploy a replacement system?”
“That would be consistent with the philosophy behind MAADS, but the project only produced four systems as a proof-of-concept, and we have deployed all four. We don't have another operational system.”
“Mr. Corrigan can you describe for us, how the three remaining MAADS systems performed?”
“The other three MAADS systems landed at the selected sites. When we were informed they were on the ground, we sent the command that initiates the deployment sequence. The systems deployed successfully, and are functioning correctly. The aerial vehicles are up and patrolling, and the tactical robots have deployed to blocking positions.
“Initially, the aerial vehicle flies over the area around the control unit, and augments the existing terrain maps before MAADS deploys its tactical robots. The augmented maps give a detailed picture of the deployment site, and MAADS uses them to determine the best locations for the tactical robots. We have downloaded those maps, and used them to verify the robot's positioning.”
Charles stepped over to the whiteboard, and began drawing a rough diagram. “All three deployment locations have similar topographies. A relatively flat col area forms a pass between high mountain peaks, and on each side the land drops away into a narrow and steep river valley. One valley is on the Iranian side of the border, and the other is on the Azerbaijan side.
“All three MAADS systems deployed their robots in almost identical ways. On the Iranian side, three robots were positioned in an arc, where the col starts to drop away to form the river valley. This allows them to look down toward the head of the valley, and the route anyone coming up the valley would take. The fourth robot was positioned to guard the approach from the Azerbaijani side of the pass.”
Captain Freedman said, “I find it strange that all three systems positioned their robots in almost identical ways?”
Charles responded, “The systems run identical software. Put in similar situations, it would be 'strange' if they didn't do very similar things.”
Colonel Saltvitz said, “Mr. Corrigan, I'd like to confirm the MAADS systems did everything you described on their own. I mean without remote operators controlling them.”
Charles was used to these kinds of naive questions, and he always tried to answer without being dismissive.
“MAADS performed all the tasks I described, autonomously. However, after it had completed its deployment, we reviewed the positions of the tactical robots, and concluded two of the MAADS systems had positioned their robots too close to the river valley. And we decided to pull them back to the pass proper and closer to the mountains, where they have greater visibility. These are the passes with no trees, and an elevated position gives maximum line-of-sight. We made no adjustments to the positioning of the robots on the pass that is tree-covered.
“We also decided, for all three systems, the aerial vehicles should patrol further down the valley than their autonomous programming told them to.
Charles decided this was an important point that needed elaboration. “MAADS has a model programmed into its command and control software that relates topography, the behavior of infiltrators, and the optimum positioning of its robots. In mountains, it expects infiltration up the river valleys and not across the mountains. Although, what the aerial vehicle sees also determines how MAADS positions the robots. We are fine tuning this model, and the interventions we made reflect improvements to the model, that we will incorporate into the software when we get the opportunity.”
The General asked, “Mr. Corrigan, can you describe what happened three days ago.”
“On April eighth, four days after MAADS deployed, System D, in the most easterly mountain pass, had a contact with a group of thirty-one men. MAADS killed four of them.”
Colonel Saltvitz said, “That’s a very precise statement, Mr. Corrigan. Not probable kills, or probable killed or wounded.”
“MAADS is a precise weapon, particularly when compared to existing alternatives. It was an important reason for its development. We have video images of all four men being shot in the head. I can arrange to show them to you if you wish to confirm the shots were fatal.”
While Charles understood he designed and built systems to kill people, he didn't like viewing the graphic confirmations MAADS provided.
“That won't be necessary.”
“Of the remaining twenty-seven men, five passed through the ambush on horseback.”
The General asked, “'Passed through on horseback' can you explain?”
Charles knew there was no point in saying there had never been a stated requirement to identify a man on horseback as a target.
“We didn't program the MAADS' software to recognize a man on horseback as a target. It's not something we anticipated. Obviously, we now realize MAADS needs to recognize men on horseback as potential targets, and we will change the search and targeting software accordingly.”
“What happened to the other twenty-two men?”
“They infiltrated past the tactical robots, by walking up the side of the river, which is hidden in a ravine. Someone down inside the ravine is not visible from the valley floor or from the pass.”
“And your system didn't detect them?”
“The MAADS aerial vehicle monitored the men the entire time. However, the only way to see down to the river is from the edge of the sheer ravine in which it flows. The three tactical robots were positioned away from the river, and consequently, couldn't get a visual on the men.”
Charles needed to explain why they had a problem, and what they would do about it.
“We designed MAADS to ensure the robots don't get into situations they can't get out of, particularly falling into holes, so the programming ensures the robots avoid steep slopes and vertical drops.
“We studied the visual images and maps MAADS created, and identified a location, on the edge of the ravine, where we could position a tactical robot to cover infiltration up the river. We directed MAADS to send one of its tactical robots there. When the robot was in position, we confirmed it could see down to the river, although, by this time, the men had passed the robot's location.”
Captain Freedman asked, “Why didn't you just remotely drive one of the robots to a position where it could see down to the river, immediately you knew the terrorists were using that route to get past the ambush? My understanding is, you had at least thirty minutes when you could have done this.”
“We don't have the capability to remotely drive the tactical robots.”
“Why not? There are systems in service that can do this, and I would have thought it would have been a routine capability in a new weapon system of this type.”
Charles felt the Captain's questioning was turning hostile. He needed to make a vigorous defense of MAADS before the perception developed, it had failed.
“MAADS is not intended to be a human-operator controlled system. It performs its functions without direct human intervention. That's what autonomous means.
“We control MAADS by changing its mission objectives or how it attempts to achieve those objectives. If DARPA had wanted a system controlled by a remote operator, then I am sure they would have directed me produce one. However, DARPA directed me to produce a system that was as autonomous as possible. I suggest, if you have an issue with that, you take it up with DARPA.”
The General continued the questioning. “So five horsemen rode through the ambush, and another twenty infiltrated past.”
“Yes, that's correct.”
Captain Freedman asked, “Did your robots pursue the infiltrators?”
“MAADS is not designed to pursue its targets. It's designed to move its robots into concealed positions and wait for targets to come to them. Once a target or a group of targets has moved past its position, and out of range of the robots, MAADS is no longer concerned with them.”
General Waxley asked, “Did any of the terrorists see the MAADS units?”
“We don't know for sure, but we do know all of the infiltrators seen by the MAADS robots are dead. It's possible, but we believe unlikely, one or more of the infiltrators saw one of the robots without the robots seeing them. We also know that all units are functioning correctly.”
“Mr. Corrigan, can you describe what has happened with the other two MAADS systems?”
“Systems A and B, successfully deployed on these two passes,” Charles pointed to the locations on the map. “About forty-five and sixty kilometers west of System D. Neither of these systems has had any kind of contact to date, and both continue to operate correctly.”
Charles paused before continuing. “I have an update on System D. It had a second contact today. I believe you were briefed about this earlier.”
The General said, “Yes, I was. This may surprise you, but we were expecting this, Mr. Corrigan. Still, I would like to hear your perspective.”
“The System D aerial vehicle detected approximately a hundred and fifty men moving up the valley on the Iranian side of the border. MAADS killed three men in an advance group. The aerial vehicle observed the rest retreat back down the valley, and they are now building a bridge across the river. We believe they intend to go over the pass where MAADS system C was destroyed. The infiltrators have also built a barricade across the trail, just below the ambush site.”
Captain Freedman asked, “Can the MAADS robots attack the barricade, and then pursue the main body of terrorists?”
“MAADS is not designed to do that. MAADS is designed to maneuver its robots into position, and wait for the enemy to come to them. I strongly advise against changing this strategy, into an aggressive one, where MAADS attacks an enemy in fixed positions. I would not be confident of success.”
The General said, “This is an important question Mr. Corrigan, and I'd like you to consider it carefully before answering. Can System D's aerial vehicle continue surveillance of the terrorists on their new route over the mountains?”
Charles replied, “Yes, but there is an issue you need to be aware of. Just before deploying MAADS, we introduced a new capability into the software that allows us to send the aerial vehicle to locations beyond the range of the data network. This means the aerial vehicle can patrol a considerable distance from the control unit, beyond the range of communications network. When the patrol is complete, its programming makes the vehicle backtrack over the route it has taken, until it regains contact with the network. However, we have not fully tested this capability, and if for any reason it doesn't work, we are unsure what will happen.”
“What do you think will happen?”
Charles knew he needed to provide the best information he could, despite its effect on perceptions of MAADS. “The aerial vehicle will likely fly around until its fuel runs out, and then crash.”
The General said, “Mr. Corrigan it is vital your aerial vehicle maintains surveillance on the main body of terrorists as long as possible, even at the risk of losing the vehicle.”
“May I ask why?”
“In summary, we knew the terrorists were coming and we have made plans to stop them should the opportunity arise. It now looks like that opportunity has arisen.
“We have to operate under certain constraints that result in a number of preconditions to a successful mission. We need sufficient lead time to mount the operation, we need to interdict the terrorists as they cross the border, and because the force can only stay in position for a very limited period, we need precise intelligence on when the terrorists will cross the border.
“By stopping the terrorists crossing the mountain pass and forcing them to cross by another route, MAADS has satisfied two of the preconditions. We now need to be confident, the third precondition is satisfied.
“Mr. Corrigan, the mission is contingent on your aerial vehicle monitoring the terrorists until they cross the border. Without this intelligence, the mission is unlikely to go ahead.”
The General concluded, “We have no more questions for you, Mr. Corrigan. Do you have any questions for us?”
“Why are we here in Romania? We could have monitored MAADS just as well from our lab in Nevada.”
“There are several reasons, not all of which may seem rational to you. The most important is that the mission headquarters is here, and we thought your proximity would facilitate performance of that mission. More generally, the Army likes to have resources under its secure control. But I agree that sometimes, it can seem the Army moves things around because the Army likes to moves things around.
“By the way, good work. We are impressed with the capabilities of your system.”
As Charles left the room, he wondered whether the final comment was just a polite means of dismissing him.
After Charles had left, General Waxley, addressed the other two officers.
“For your information, Colonel, the use of cruise missiles was evaluated and rejected. We know from past experience that with precise intelligence, cruise missile strikes against men camped in the open are moderately effective, inflicting casualty rates of 10 to 30 percent. If the MAADS aerial vehicle can give us precise data on the terrorist's next camp, there is a good probability that a number of cruise missiles would cause sufficient casualties that the terrorists withdraw. However, this tactic is unlikely to significantly deter future infiltrations, and will likely result in them sending smaller or dispersed groups. Consequently, the effect of using of cruise missiles would be short term disruption to the infiltrations and this was deemed an unacceptable outcome.
“The National Command Authority has decided a decisive strike is needed to send a message to the Iranians that terrorist infiltrators will be vigorously opposed. This requires boots on the ground.
“CENTCOM asked the Marine Corps and SOCOM to present plans to deploy a force to interdict the terrorists.
“There is a Marine Task Force in the Black Sea on exercises, and at first we thought they would get the mission, but the Marine Corps declined to offer a plan.”
Colonel Saltvitz asked, “Do you know why, General?”
“The Task Force is currently, about seventy kilometers off the Georgian coast and approximately the same distance from the Turkish coast. They can't get too much closer without attracting unwanted attention from the Russians.
”In order to get to the Talish mountains, the Marine helicopters would have to transit two entire countries, albeit rather small countries - Georgia and Azerbaijan itself, a distance of almost four hundred kilometers, and close to the absolute range of the helicopters. They would need to refuel on the way there and on the way back. They also need clearance to cross the airspace of both countries, and it was far from certain such clearance would be forthcoming. The Marine Corps concluded the distance was too far with too many risks.”
“Colonel, I'd like you to run me through your plan.”
“General, our planning team has been at the Mihail Kogalniceanu military Air Base for the last five days preparing an Intermediate Staging Base for a rapid deployment by a Ranger rifle company, with battalion command and control, out of Fort Benning, Georgia. That company can deploy in nine hours. The flight time is twelve hours, Which means we can be on the ground in Romania by noon tomorrow.
“Our plan is to paradrop at night, and recover the force by land."
It took the Colonel less than five minutes to outline his plan.
The General asked, “Are planes available?”
“Two C130s are on standby.”
“Do we have clearances for military transport aircraft to transit these countries?”
“Yes we do, under existing overflight agreements. The planes will have to deviate from those flight corridors by less than fifty kilometers – less than fifteen minutes flight time. We doubt anyone will notice. Baku air traffic control might. If they do, we will just tell them to get the Russians to fix their faulty equipment.”
“Colonel, just to confirm, you are aware there is no possibility of air support.”
“Yes.”
“Then we recommend this plan to CENTCOM. Colonel, I am authorized to make any deployments necessary to facilitate the plan we recommend. That means the Ready Reaction Company, 75th Ranger are heading to Romania.
“We will have to involve the CIA and State in the arrangements for the ground recovery.
“Thank you, gentlemen. Do you have any final questions?”
The Colonel asked, “General, it looks to me like the Iranians could cross the river today. It's about fifteen kilometers from the river crossing to the pass, so they could cross into Azerbaijan sometime tomorrow. The earliest we can deploy is tomorrow night, and that may be too late.”
“Colonel, if it is too late, we will know for sure sometime tomorrow, assuming our surveillance asset remains in place. If by dusk tomorrow the terrorists have crossed the pass, and are moving down the other side into Azerbaijan, then we will have missed our window of opportunity. We will have to abort the mission, and you and your men will get some unexpected R&R here in sunny Romania.”
Chapter 29
April 11, 2006
An unmarked Ford sedan drove Charles across the extensive airbase, toward a cluster of concrete buildings that had seen better days. The vehicle passed through a guarded gate in a new chain link fence.
His driver escorted him into one of the buildings where two officers were waiting. A corporal attended to some telecommunications equipment.
The older of the two introduced himself. “I'm General Waxley. This is Captain Freedman. I hope this meeting hasn't inconvenienced you, but we felt an in-person briefing was appropriate.”
Charles wasn't aware he'd had a choice in the matter.
The General continued without waiting for a response. “Colonel Saltvitz, commanding officer of
the 75th Ranger Regiment will join us by videoconference.
“Mr. Corrigan, I represent SOCOM – The Special Operations Command. We are responsible for all US Special Forces. I have brought you here today for several reasons.
“The primary reason is to brief Colonel Saltvitz on the events that have occurred since the MAADS systems were deployed. He also needs to understand the system's capabilities because we intend to rely on those capabilities in an upcoming mission. While the Colonel and the Captain here have read the specifications, it's appropriate for you to provide background to help them get a clearer understanding of the system capabilities and limitations, before we put men's lives at risk.
“A particular concern of mine, is control and oversight of autonomous weapons. We find ourselves in a situation that arguably we should have better anticipated. Missions are proceeding outside the established chain of command, and all that entails, and I have been charged with looking at how we bring these technologies into our C2 systems and existing military structures.
“Captain Freedman has two roles. He will be your liaison officer, the point of contact between the MAADS team and both the Army Rangers and SOCOM. In that capacity, he will ensure MAADS contributes to the overall success of the mission.
“His other role is to advise me on MAADS performance. A specific responsibility of mine, is evaluating new technologies and weapon systems, some of which, frankly, are of marginal value.”
Without warning or asking if Charles needed clarification, the General switched to a conversational tone.
“How are you enjoying life on the base?”
Charles replied, “The accommodation is spartan, but the food is much better than I expected.”
“Good food is one way we make these hardship postings more bearable.”
“And your people?”
“A couple of them want to know why we are under guard all the time.”
“This is a large base. Jointly built by the Russians and the Romanian government. Neither is interested in using it at present. We are interested because of its strategic location. Having said that, this is not our base and much of it still needs to be cleaned up. It would be dangerous for a civilian to wander around.”
The General appeared to have finished with the small talk, and stood waiting. Charles inspected the room. It was a crumbling concrete box, with peeling paint, and a rundown quality. A small table and half a dozen collapsible chairs occupied the center.
In sharp contrast to the rest of the room, along one wall were a large new whiteboard on wheels, the telecommunications equipment the Corporal was working on, and two large-scale maps, one of the Black Sea and the other of the Caucasus region.
A screen beside the Corporal came to life and showed a tall officer in his late thirties standing in what might have been his office. The Corporal said, “We are online now, sir.”
The man on the screen said, “Can you hear me, General?”
General Waxley replied, “Yes, we can Colonel. I'll assume you can hear me.”
“Loud and clear.”
“I have Mr. Corrigan and Captain Freedman with me. Before we start the briefing, do you have any questions, Mr. Corrigan?”
“I have one question. I'd like to know why am I only briefing the three of you?”
The General replied, “The Army does not deliberately keep officers and men in the dark. However, MAADS is classified equipment, and unless you can present a reason why more people need to know the nature of the equipment, they will only be told that we have a surveillance asset capable of providing near real time intelligence.”
Charles couldn't think of a reason. In his experience, users needed to know what technology did, and how it would help them do their job. Telling them how it worked, generally proved a distraction.
The General indicated Charles should start his briefing and he started speaking.
“We were notified four weeks ago, on March thirteenth, that we had two weeks to prepare as many MAADS systems as possible, and a support team, to deploy at forty-eight hours notice. We received the Deployment Order nine days ago.
“Before we left, we were given maps and satellite photographs of the proposed deployment locations, and I was asked to confirm whether they were suitable for MAADS.”
The General asked, “And were they?”
“The ground was snow-covered in all the photographs, and I had to say we weren't sure. They looked suitable from the topographic maps, but topographic maps aren't detailed enough for our purposes. We were also given images produced by ground mapping radar, and they showed the locations were flat enough for MAADS to deploy and contained a suitable sheltered depression in the ground.
“All four locations were mountain passes. I believe geographers call these features 'cols'. They are areas of flat ground between mountain peaks where the heads of two river valleys, running down either side of the mountain range, meet. Three of the cols were devoid of tree cover. The fourth was mostly tree-covered, but did have areas of bare rock. I agreed, all four seemed suitable deployment sites, although I expressed reservations about the fourth.
"Three days later, we were on a military transport aircraft en route to here. Although we weren't told that Romania was our destination until we were in the air.”
The General asked, “How was the flight?”
“Let's say, I'll never complain about traveling economy class again.”
“Continue, Mr. Corrigan.”
“We landed here at this airfield, and US personnel unloaded the four MAADS systems we had prepared for deployment. We went through our predeployment checks before the systems were taken away, and I understand, loaded onto another aircraft we didn't see. We were then taken to the portable offices we now occupy, and told to get our monitoring system up and running immediately, as the aircraft was sitting on the tarmac waiting to go.
“Less than six hours later everything checked out, and I gave the go ahead. I then told my people to get a few hours sleep, as there was nothing further they could do until the MAADS systems were paradropped onto their deployment locations.”
The General said, “All three of us know what happened in that deployment, but could you give us your perspective, Mr. Corrigan?”
“Three of the systems deployed successfully. The fourth failed. We don't how or why. It didn't transmit, and it didn't respond to our transmissions. We were told the only visual image we could get was via a satellite, and it would not be real-time.”
“What did that image show you?”
“The MAADS system was at the base of a steep mountainside several hundred meters from its planned landing site. It looked like it had tumbled down the slope, judging from the damage we could see on the satellite images.
“When we requested through our military liaison officer for it to be recovered, we were told it couldn't be recovered, and we would have to destroy it. As a result, we scheduled time on a satellite capable of providing visual images of the area. When the satellite was overhead, we sent out the destruction command, which caused the MAADS system to fire its built-in demolition charges.”
“Did the demolition charges destroy the system?”
“As far as we could determine, they did. The satellite photographs showed the MAADS system burning fiercely, as it is designed to.”
The General asked, “Can you elaborate on that statement?”
“One of our design criteria was to ensure we could remotely destroy the whole MAADS system or any autonomous part of MAADS, so all the units are rigged with thermal charges. The thermal charges burn hot enough to destroy the electronics and data storage in the control unit and the autonomous vehicles, as well as seriously damage most nonmetallic materials. The thermal charges are fired by a remote command. Once that happens, there is not much left, just some badly burned scrap. A contractor installed the thermal charges for us, and I just have a basic understanding of how they work.”
“Is there anything left that can identify the equipment's origin?”
“You might be able to read the VINs or chassis numbers on the all-terrain-vehicles used in the tactical mobile robots, but not much else.”
The General said, “Thank you, Mr. Corrigan. We are just confirming we don't need to send in a demolition team or bomb the site.”
Charles responded, “I assure you, if the charges went off, and they did, there is nothing useful to recover, maybe twenty dollar's worth of scrap metal.”
“Can we deploy a replacement system?”
“That would be consistent with the philosophy behind MAADS, but the project only produced four systems as a proof-of-concept, and we have deployed all four. We don't have another operational system.”
“Mr. Corrigan can you describe for us, how the three remaining MAADS systems performed?”
“The other three MAADS systems landed at the selected sites. When we were informed they were on the ground, we sent the command that initiates the deployment sequence. The systems deployed successfully, and are functioning correctly. The aerial vehicles are up and patrolling, and the tactical robots have deployed to blocking positions.
“Initially, the aerial vehicle flies over the area around the control unit, and augments the existing terrain maps before MAADS deploys its tactical robots. The augmented maps give a detailed picture of the deployment site, and MAADS uses them to determine the best locations for the tactical robots. We have downloaded those maps, and used them to verify the robot's positioning.”
Charles stepped over to the whiteboard, and began drawing a rough diagram. “All three deployment locations have similar topographies. A relatively flat col area forms a pass between high mountain peaks, and on each side the land drops away into a narrow and steep river valley. One valley is on the Iranian side of the border, and the other is on the Azerbaijan side.
“All three MAADS systems deployed their robots in almost identical ways. On the Iranian side, three robots were positioned in an arc, where the col starts to drop away to form the river valley. This allows them to look down toward the head of the valley, and the route anyone coming up the valley would take. The fourth robot was positioned to guard the approach from the Azerbaijani side of the pass.”
Captain Freedman said, “I find it strange that all three systems positioned their robots in almost identical ways?”
Charles responded, “The systems run identical software. Put in similar situations, it would be 'strange' if they didn't do very similar things.”
Colonel Saltvitz said, “Mr. Corrigan, I'd like to confirm the MAADS systems did everything you described on their own. I mean without remote operators controlling them.”
Charles was used to these kinds of naive questions, and he always tried to answer without being dismissive.
“MAADS performed all the tasks I described, autonomously. However, after it had completed its deployment, we reviewed the positions of the tactical robots, and concluded two of the MAADS systems had positioned their robots too close to the river valley. And we decided to pull them back to the pass proper and closer to the mountains, where they have greater visibility. These are the passes with no trees, and an elevated position gives maximum line-of-sight. We made no adjustments to the positioning of the robots on the pass that is tree-covered.
“We also decided, for all three systems, the aerial vehicles should patrol further down the valley than their autonomous programming told them to.
Charles decided this was an important point that needed elaboration. “MAADS has a model programmed into its command and control software that relates topography, the behavior of infiltrators, and the optimum positioning of its robots. In mountains, it expects infiltration up the river valleys and not across the mountains. Although, what the aerial vehicle sees also determines how MAADS positions the robots. We are fine tuning this model, and the interventions we made reflect improvements to the model, that we will incorporate into the software when we get the opportunity.”
The General asked, “Mr. Corrigan, can you describe what happened three days ago.”
“On April eighth, four days after MAADS deployed, System D, in the most easterly mountain pass, had a contact with a group of thirty-one men. MAADS killed four of them.”
Colonel Saltvitz said, “That’s a very precise statement, Mr. Corrigan. Not probable kills, or probable killed or wounded.”
“MAADS is a precise weapon, particularly when compared to existing alternatives. It was an important reason for its development. We have video images of all four men being shot in the head. I can arrange to show them to you if you wish to confirm the shots were fatal.”
While Charles understood he designed and built systems to kill people, he didn't like viewing the graphic confirmations MAADS provided.
“That won't be necessary.”
“Of the remaining twenty-seven men, five passed through the ambush on horseback.”
The General asked, “'Passed through on horseback' can you explain?”
Charles knew there was no point in saying there had never been a stated requirement to identify a man on horseback as a target.
“We didn't program the MAADS' software to recognize a man on horseback as a target. It's not something we anticipated. Obviously, we now realize MAADS needs to recognize men on horseback as potential targets, and we will change the search and targeting software accordingly.”
“What happened to the other twenty-two men?”
“They infiltrated past the tactical robots, by walking up the side of the river, which is hidden in a ravine. Someone down inside the ravine is not visible from the valley floor or from the pass.”
“And your system didn't detect them?”
“The MAADS aerial vehicle monitored the men the entire time. However, the only way to see down to the river is from the edge of the sheer ravine in which it flows. The three tactical robots were positioned away from the river, and consequently, couldn't get a visual on the men.”
Charles needed to explain why they had a problem, and what they would do about it.
“We designed MAADS to ensure the robots don't get into situations they can't get out of, particularly falling into holes, so the programming ensures the robots avoid steep slopes and vertical drops.
“We studied the visual images and maps MAADS created, and identified a location, on the edge of the ravine, where we could position a tactical robot to cover infiltration up the river. We directed MAADS to send one of its tactical robots there. When the robot was in position, we confirmed it could see down to the river, although, by this time, the men had passed the robot's location.”
Captain Freedman asked, “Why didn't you just remotely drive one of the robots to a position where it could see down to the river, immediately you knew the terrorists were using that route to get past the ambush? My understanding is, you had at least thirty minutes when you could have done this.”
“We don't have the capability to remotely drive the tactical robots.”
“Why not? There are systems in service that can do this, and I would have thought it would have been a routine capability in a new weapon system of this type.”
Charles felt the Captain's questioning was turning hostile. He needed to make a vigorous defense of MAADS before the perception developed, it had failed.
“MAADS is not intended to be a human-operator controlled system. It performs its functions without direct human intervention. That's what autonomous means.
“We control MAADS by changing its mission objectives or how it attempts to achieve those objectives. If DARPA had wanted a system controlled by a remote operator, then I am sure they would have directed me produce one. However, DARPA directed me to produce a system that was as autonomous as possible. I suggest, if you have an issue with that, you take it up with DARPA.”
The General continued the questioning. “So five horsemen rode through the ambush, and another twenty infiltrated past.”
“Yes, that's correct.”
Captain Freedman asked, “Did your robots pursue the infiltrators?”
“MAADS is not designed to pursue its targets. It's designed to move its robots into concealed positions and wait for targets to come to them. Once a target or a group of targets has moved past its position, and out of range of the robots, MAADS is no longer concerned with them.”
General Waxley asked, “Did any of the terrorists see the MAADS units?”
“We don't know for sure, but we do know all of the infiltrators seen by the MAADS robots are dead. It's possible, but we believe unlikely, one or more of the infiltrators saw one of the robots without the robots seeing them. We also know that all units are functioning correctly.”
“Mr. Corrigan, can you describe what has happened with the other two MAADS systems?”
“Systems A and B, successfully deployed on these two passes,” Charles pointed to the locations on the map. “About forty-five and sixty kilometers west of System D. Neither of these systems has had any kind of contact to date, and both continue to operate correctly.”
Charles paused before continuing. “I have an update on System D. It had a second contact today. I believe you were briefed about this earlier.”
The General said, “Yes, I was. This may surprise you, but we were expecting this, Mr. Corrigan. Still, I would like to hear your perspective.”
“The System D aerial vehicle detected approximately a hundred and fifty men moving up the valley on the Iranian side of the border. MAADS killed three men in an advance group. The aerial vehicle observed the rest retreat back down the valley, and they are now building a bridge across the river. We believe they intend to go over the pass where MAADS system C was destroyed. The infiltrators have also built a barricade across the trail, just below the ambush site.”
Captain Freedman asked, “Can the MAADS robots attack the barricade, and then pursue the main body of terrorists?”
“MAADS is not designed to do that. MAADS is designed to maneuver its robots into position, and wait for the enemy to come to them. I strongly advise against changing this strategy, into an aggressive one, where MAADS attacks an enemy in fixed positions. I would not be confident of success.”
The General said, “This is an important question Mr. Corrigan, and I'd like you to consider it carefully before answering. Can System D's aerial vehicle continue surveillance of the terrorists on their new route over the mountains?”
Charles replied, “Yes, but there is an issue you need to be aware of. Just before deploying MAADS, we introduced a new capability into the software that allows us to send the aerial vehicle to locations beyond the range of the data network. This means the aerial vehicle can patrol a considerable distance from the control unit, beyond the range of communications network. When the patrol is complete, its programming makes the vehicle backtrack over the route it has taken, until it regains contact with the network. However, we have not fully tested this capability, and if for any reason it doesn't work, we are unsure what will happen.”
“What do you think will happen?”
Charles knew he needed to provide the best information he could, despite its effect on perceptions of MAADS. “The aerial vehicle will likely fly around until its fuel runs out, and then crash.”
The General said, “Mr. Corrigan it is vital your aerial vehicle maintains surveillance on the main body of terrorists as long as possible, even at the risk of losing the vehicle.”
“May I ask why?”
“In summary, we knew the terrorists were coming and we have made plans to stop them should the opportunity arise. It now looks like that opportunity has arisen.
“We have to operate under certain constraints that result in a number of preconditions to a successful mission. We need sufficient lead time to mount the operation, we need to interdict the terrorists as they cross the border, and because the force can only stay in position for a very limited period, we need precise intelligence on when the terrorists will cross the border.
“By stopping the terrorists crossing the mountain pass and forcing them to cross by another route, MAADS has satisfied two of the preconditions. We now need to be confident, the third precondition is satisfied.
“Mr. Corrigan, the mission is contingent on your aerial vehicle monitoring the terrorists until they cross the border. Without this intelligence, the mission is unlikely to go ahead.”
The General concluded, “We have no more questions for you, Mr. Corrigan. Do you have any questions for us?”
“Why are we here in Romania? We could have monitored MAADS just as well from our lab in Nevada.”
“There are several reasons, not all of which may seem rational to you. The most important is that the mission headquarters is here, and we thought your proximity would facilitate performance of that mission. More generally, the Army likes to have resources under its secure control. But I agree that sometimes, it can seem the Army moves things around because the Army likes to moves things around.
“By the way, good work. We are impressed with the capabilities of your system.”
As Charles left the room, he wondered whether the final comment was just a polite means of dismissing him.
After Charles had left, General Waxley, addressed the other two officers.
“For your information, Colonel, the use of cruise missiles was evaluated and rejected. We know from past experience that with precise intelligence, cruise missile strikes against men camped in the open are moderately effective, inflicting casualty rates of 10 to 30 percent. If the MAADS aerial vehicle can give us precise data on the terrorist's next camp, there is a good probability that a number of cruise missiles would cause sufficient casualties that the terrorists withdraw. However, this tactic is unlikely to significantly deter future infiltrations, and will likely result in them sending smaller or dispersed groups. Consequently, the effect of using of cruise missiles would be short term disruption to the infiltrations and this was deemed an unacceptable outcome.
“The National Command Authority has decided a decisive strike is needed to send a message to the Iranians that terrorist infiltrators will be vigorously opposed. This requires boots on the ground.
“CENTCOM asked the Marine Corps and SOCOM to present plans to deploy a force to interdict the terrorists.
“There is a Marine Task Force in the Black Sea on exercises, and at first we thought they would get the mission, but the Marine Corps declined to offer a plan.”
Colonel Saltvitz asked, “Do you know why, General?”
“The Task Force is currently, about seventy kilometers off the Georgian coast and approximately the same distance from the Turkish coast. They can't get too much closer without attracting unwanted attention from the Russians.
”In order to get to the Talish mountains, the Marine helicopters would have to transit two entire countries, albeit rather small countries - Georgia and Azerbaijan itself, a distance of almost four hundred kilometers, and close to the absolute range of the helicopters. They would need to refuel on the way there and on the way back. They also need clearance to cross the airspace of both countries, and it was far from certain such clearance would be forthcoming. The Marine Corps concluded the distance was too far with too many risks.”
“Colonel, I'd like you to run me through your plan.”
“General, our planning team has been at the Mihail Kogalniceanu military Air Base for the last five days preparing an Intermediate Staging Base for a rapid deployment by a Ranger rifle company, with battalion command and control, out of Fort Benning, Georgia. That company can deploy in nine hours. The flight time is twelve hours, Which means we can be on the ground in Romania by noon tomorrow.
“Our plan is to paradrop at night, and recover the force by land."
It took the Colonel less than five minutes to outline his plan.
The General asked, “Are planes available?”
“Two C130s are on standby.”
“Do we have clearances for military transport aircraft to transit these countries?”
“Yes we do, under existing overflight agreements. The planes will have to deviate from those flight corridors by less than fifty kilometers – less than fifteen minutes flight time. We doubt anyone will notice. Baku air traffic control might. If they do, we will just tell them to get the Russians to fix their faulty equipment.”
“Colonel, just to confirm, you are aware there is no possibility of air support.”
“Yes.”
“Then we recommend this plan to CENTCOM. Colonel, I am authorized to make any deployments necessary to facilitate the plan we recommend. That means the Ready Reaction Company, 75th Ranger are heading to Romania.
“We will have to involve the CIA and State in the arrangements for the ground recovery.
“Thank you, gentlemen. Do you have any final questions?”
The Colonel asked, “General, it looks to me like the Iranians could cross the river today. It's about fifteen kilometers from the river crossing to the pass, so they could cross into Azerbaijan sometime tomorrow. The earliest we can deploy is tomorrow night, and that may be too late.”
“Colonel, if it is too late, we will know for sure sometime tomorrow, assuming our surveillance asset remains in place. If by dusk tomorrow the terrorists have crossed the pass, and are moving down the other side into Azerbaijan, then we will have missed our window of opportunity. We will have to abort the mission, and you and your men will get some unexpected R&R here in sunny Romania.”
Chapter 29
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